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IntroductIon
Postcolonial Migrations and Identity Politics
Towards a Comparative Perspective
Ulbe Bosma, Jan Lucassen and Gert Oostindie
On the eve of the Second World War, the governments of Western Europe 
were as ill-prepared for the war to come as they were for its devastating 
consequences to their colonial empires. Even less did they anticipate the 
large-scale migrations that would accompany decolonization. This book 
addresses postcolonial migrations, not just to Europe but also beyond. 
The assumption of the contributions is that it is useful to differentiate the 
category of ‘postcolonial migrants’ from other types of migrants, because 
of their pre-migration legal status, their familiarity with metropolitan lan-
guage and culture, and possibly also because of kinship relations with 
the metropolitan population. The obvious next question then becomes 
whether these pre-migration characteristics, and possibly identity politics 
based on the individual pre-migration history, facilitated their integration 
in the metropolis – and, conversely, how their long-standing relationships 
with the metropolis impinged upon the way metropolitan governments 
and populations at large perceived these ‘repatriating’ immigrants.
In this introduction, we explore some of the broader themes which are 
addressed in greater depth in the following chapters on specific countries. 
We first present an overview of postcolonial migrations, making the case 
for a broader perspective beyond the obvious European examples. Next, 
we discuss in more detail the paradoxical linkages between decoloniza-
tion and postcolonial migration. This in turn leads to another look at the 
very concept of the ‘postcolonial migrant’. In the next two sections we 
summarize the various trajectories of postcolonial migrations to Europe 
and beyond. The closing section offers some hypotheses and preliminary 
answers to the questions raised.
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Yet as Nicole Cohen writes in this book, the number of post-imperial Japa-
nese immigrants ‘coming home’ after 1945 amounted to a staggering 6.5 
million as well. In his discussion of Puerto Rican migration to the United 
States, Jorge Duany makes the point that the present number of migrants 
from this Caribbean-associated territory is now some four million, but that 
this number easily doubles if we include migrants from the communities 
originating in the former protectorate of Cuba and the pre-war colony of 
the Philippines. By the mid-1990s, the break-up of the Soviet Union had 
resulted in some nine million refugees in its former constituent states.2 As 
Allison Blakely demonstrates in this book, the migratory consequences of 
this imperial collapse have continued apace ever since.
These migrations had immediate demographic consequences for the 
receiving countries. The dissolution of the Soviet Union led to massive 
migration movements, and the Japanese population had increased by 7.5 
per cent in the wake of its retreat from Asia. Less dramatic but still im-
portant in terms of demography were the emigrations to France, Great 
Britain and the Netherlands, with population increases of between 3 and 
4 per cent, whereas the figures for Western Germany and Portugal would 
be respectively 8.1 and 7.5 per cent (see table I.1). At present, first or 
second generation postcolonial migrants make up 7 to 8 per cent of the 
total British and French populations. With 10 per cent, the European 
proportion is highest in Portugal, whereas the figure is relatively low in 
the Netherlands, at just over 6 per cent. The overwhelming majority of 
migrants from the non-industrial South originated from the former colo-
nies. The major exception to this rule is the Netherlands, where there was 
remarkably little overlap between postcolonial immigration streams and 
labour recruitment.
With the notable exception of the United States and to a lesser degree 
France, none of these societies had seriously considered themselves to be 
countries of immigration. After the Second World War the Western Euro-
pean colonizing states, Japan and Russia, changed almost overnight from 
highly expansionist nations to societies confined within their own borders 
attracting large groups of immigrants. This applies equally to Germany, 
whose role as a European colonizing state is often forgotten. Of course 
the German state was forced to cede its overseas possessions after its de-
feat in the First World War, but this transition did not result in significant 
postcolonial migration to Germany. The shrinking of its territory (Aus-
grenzung) and the eventual defeat of the Nazi regime, however, brought 
about a massive ‘repatriation’ of Germans and Volksdeutsche – descendants 
of Germans who, often centuries ago, had settled in the Balkans and Rus-
sia. In a long, drawn-out process starting in the late eighteenth century, 
Postcolonial Migrations: An Overview
In the wake of the dissolution of the European empires following the Sec-
ond World War, large flows of migrants reached the former metropolitan 
countries. These movements were momentous and dramatic, but also lim-
ited in time (mainly the first decades after the war) and place (Europe and 
its former colonies). These migrations are well documented, to the point 
that they have obscured a wider, indeed global, phenomenon. Colonial 
powers were not exclusively European, neither were massive migrations af-
ter the collapse of empires unique to the period after 1945. In Europe, the 
end of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, the devastation of the 
German Reich after 1945 and the implosion of the Soviet Union (the suc-
cessor to the Tsarist Empire) caused massive movements of populations. 
Postcolonial migrations were not limited to European colonial powers, 
as shown by the post-1945 repatriation of Japanese from Manchuria and 
Korea. In a totally different political context, the massive displacement of 
people as a result of the partition of the former British Raj into India and 
Pakistan in 1947 is also a postcolonial migratory movement.
To complicate matters, if these postcolonial movements of people were 
indeed prompted by political change, the line between postcolonial migra-
tion and labour or ‘welfare’ immigration is not easy to draw. Even long af-
ter decolonization had been concluded, and in spite of restrictive policies, 
the United Kingdom and France in particular continued to attract large 
numbers of migrants from their former colonies. From yet another per-
spective, in some exceptional, mainly Caribbean, cases decolonization was 
not accomplished by a transfer of sovereignty but rather by some model 
of further integration with the metropolis. This is the case with the French 
overseas departments, the Netherlands Antilles and a few remaining Brit-
ish overseas territories, but equally with the former American colonies of 
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. In all of these cases, the continu-
ation of constitutional bonds would prove a stimulus for migration to 
the metropolis. Again, it is difficult to differentiate between ‘postcolonial’ 
and labour migration in these instances. In the American case, the picture 
becomes even more blurred should we conceive as somehow ‘postcolo-
nial’ the massive migration from the informal former empire – from Cuba 
through the rest of Latin America to the Philippines.
In short, European postcolonial immigration is part of a larger history; 
the large influx of postcolonial immigrants was not unique to Europe and 
there is no clear-cut definition of the postcolonial migrant. In the pioneer-
ing study Europe’s Invisible Migrants, the editor Andrea L. Smith calcu-
lated that between 1945 and 1990, Western and Southern Europe received 
some five to seven million immigrants from (former) overseas territories.1 
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Table I.1. Postcolonial immigrants and their proportion of the population of 




Population (millions) Postcolonial immigrants’ 
proportion
Turkey (1930) ? 14 >10
West-Germany (1980) 5 62 8.1
Japan (1950) 6.250 83 7.5
Portugal (1980) 0.650 10 6.5
Russia (2000) 6 143 4.2
The Netherlands (1980) 0.550 14 3.9
France (1970) 2 51 3.9
U.K. (1970) 2 56 3.6
United States (2000) 4.350 298 1.4
Belgium (2000) 0.125 10 1.2
Italy (2000) 0.550 58 0.9
Spain (2000) 0.180 43 0.4
Figures derived from Smith, Invisible Migrants, p. 32, with the following additions: 
Spain excluding recent flows from Latin America; Germany and Turkey see further 
on in the Introduction; Russia based on Perevedentsev, ‘Migratsiia naseleniia’, http://
www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/B08_12/Main.htm,4 and estimates Gijs Kessler, IISH; Japan, 
see Nicole Cohen, this book; U.S.A., see Jorge Duany, this book (excluding migrants 
from Cuba and the Philippines, which would bring the total to 8.4 million). 
*Reference years pertain to the period in which the great majority of first-generation 
postcolonial migrants had settled. Absolute figures given for the number of postco-
lonial migrants are rough estimates; the same therefore applies to the suggested pro-
portional share.
Decolonization and Postcolonial Immigration
The different decolonization processes produced two, opposing outcomes 
with crucial implications for migration dynamics. The classical, most fre-
quent and indeed intuitively logical outcome was the transfer of sover-
eignty, as in the cases of India/Pakistan, Indonesia, Algeria, Angola, and 
so on. Such constitutional changes were sometimes accomplished after 
serious armed struggles, sometimes after protracted negotiations, and of-
ten following a combination of both. In many cases the prospect of inde-
pendence caused mass migrations to the metropolis from those segments 
of society whose fate was directly tied to the colonial structure: European 
settlers, Eurasian and Eurafrican middle classes, colonial soldiers and the 
the Turkish Empire experienced similar immigration waves as a conse-
quence of its retreat from the Balkans. 
It took quite some time before scholars started thinking of these post-
colonial migrations, and the related immigration and integration experi-
ences, as a distinct category of migration. The past decades have seen an 
avalanche of studies on virtually all dimensions of migration, focusing on 
the migrants themselves, on integration and identification, on political 
opportunity structures and identity politics, on transnationalism and so 
on.3 Of course, much of this work has focused on postcolonial migra-
tions, particularly to Europe. However, we believe that to date, a system-
atic comparison of postcolonial migrations worldwide has been lacking.
We are aware that our usage of the concept ‘postcolonial’ may elicit 
questions and opposition. The field of what has become known as ‘post-
colonial studies’ is dominated by discourses on the relationships of power 
in many fields (economic, political, discursive) between formerly colo-
nized peoples and metropolitan power. In this paradigm, the term ‘post-
colonial migrants’ would be reserved for subaltern migrants from the 
(former) colonies, rather than for returning settlers and colonial elites. As 
will become evident from the rest of our introduction and indeed from 
all following chapters, the present usage of ‘postcolonial’ is broader both 
in its application to a wider set of migrants and in our rejection of the 
theoretical underpinnings of this one particular interpretation of colonial 
and postcolonial history. 
The essays in this book aim to provide historical body and substance 
to debates on (postcolonial) immigration in the core group of European 
countries – Great Britain, France, Portugal and the Netherlands – in a 
comparative framework. These contributions address in a systematic way 
for individual countries, the themes of migration, citizenship, metropoli-
tan opportunity structures and postcolonial migrants’ identity politics. As 
such, they provide state of the art overviews on each of these national 
experiences. Taken together, these studies provide a rare comparative per-
spective on areas of the post-war world with entirely different immigra-
tion regimes. We feel the comparison of these individual cases, including 
the emergence and reception of postcolonial identity politics, will help us 
address the crucial, wider question of how societies deal with contempo-
rary social inequality and ethnic and religious differences, and with the 
place of their own colonial history in their understanding of the nation 
and national identity. 
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war decolonization took the form of a constitutional incorporation into 
a new postcolonial political structure did postcolonial citizenship include 
the right of abode in the metropolis. 
Citizenship rights rooted in the colonial period, pre-migration social-
ization, command of the metropolitan language, educational, cultural 
and sometimes religious affinity – in short, what Gert Oostindie in his 
contribution concerning the Netherlands summarizes as ‘the postcolonial 
bonus’ – were usually of great help in the integration of postcolonial im-
migrants. In their early phases of settlement they were often assisted by 
metropolitan governments facilitating their access to housing, the labour 
market and welfare provision. This assistance, of course, was not meted 
out with the same intensity everywhere, with the emerging Western Eu-
ropean welfare states providing the most extensive support, particularly 
after the 1960s.
Neither was state support evenly distributed to citizens of former met-
ropolitan nations. In general, postcolonial immigrants closest to the co-
lonial rulers benefited most, whereas those perceived as ethnically distinct 
and non-European had more problems acquiring full citizenship rights 
and were more likely to encounter discrimination. In most countries, in 
spite of a postcolonial bonus, substantial numbers ended up in disadvan-
taged parts of cities and overrepresented in the top rankings of all the 
wrong lists, whether for unemployment, housing or deviancy.
The record for intergenerational social upward mobility seems mixed, 
but just as for other immigrants there are firm indications, not of overall 
improvement but certainly of incremental success over the generations. 
Timing mattered a lot. Postcolonial immigrants arriving in Europe after 
three decades of unprecedented economic growth might have benefited 
from unhindered entrance and other full citizenship rights, but neverthe-
less found themselves competing with other ‘guest labourers’ in a post-
industrial labour market. The children of the French Antilleans recruited 
in the 1960s for the expanding French labour market found that their 
competitive advantages crumbled a few decades later. In contrast to their 
traditional preferential status, these négropolitains were subsequently often 
seen as belonging to a diffuse category of black French, including the large 
numbers of later, often illegal, sub-Saharan African immigrants. In all, as 
with the Caribbean youth in Britain or the Netherlands, or with Puerto 
Ricans in the United States, pre-migration social and cultural capital is 
but one factor determining the chances for successful social integration 
of these immigrants, the host society’s acceptance of them, and immi-
grant identification with society at large. The sharp rise in unemployment 
figures in Europe in the 1980s has washed away the ‘bonus’ of being a 
postcolonial immigrant. 
like. In some other cases, especially in the Caribbean, independence was 
relatively easily negotiated with an encouraging metropolis that was no 
longer interested in the retention of its former empire. Unexpectedly, the 
transfer of sovereignty in these instances was preceded and/or accompa-
nied by mass migration involving cross-sections of the former colonial 
populations, as citizens – much against the high hopes of the nationalists 
– voted with their feet against the new constitutional status. In none of 
these cases were the metropolitan governments and societies particularly 
enthusiastic about the mass immigrations. In all of these, the migrants 
exercised the still prevalent, or at least enforceable, rights of citizenship 
they would lose after the transfer of sovereignty. 
The alternative outcome of the post-war decolonization process was 
some sort of neo-colonial arrangement, in most cases endorsing a degree 
of autonomy for the former colony, in some others full integration, but 
ultimately continuing a direct postcolonial constitutional relationship. 
This applied invariably to small entities, the ‘confetti of empires’ scattered 
around the globe but concentrated in the Caribbean. In this sub-region of 
the Americas, three European powers as well as the United States are still 
constitutionally present, partly or even mainly because the local popula-
tions have refused to accept independence. In all cases this mutual ac-
ceptance of a neo-colonial relationship implied affirming or bequeathing 
full citizenship rights to the inhabitants of the non-sovereign territories, 
and in most cases – until recently the U.K. was a glaring exception – these 
citizenship rights included the right of abode in the metropolis. In most 
instances, this right stimulated mass settlement in the metropolis and an 
atypical pattern of persistent circular migration.
Returning to the entire category of postcolonial migrants, we should 
make some crucial qualifications to the notion of full metropolitan citizen-
ship rights. Included in this is distinguishing between citizenship rights 
and the right of repatriation. In most postcolonial metropolitan states, 
the latter is enshrined in the concept of ‘repatriates’ or ‘returnees’, repatri-
anten (Dutch), retornados (Portuguese), repatrianty (Russian) or hikiage-
sha (literally ‘salvaged’, Japanese). Most metropolitan countries were 
initially hesitant to endow such rights to postcolonial immigrants. Some 
withdrew these rights at some point with the objective of discouraging 
or curtailing immigration from the decolonizing territories, as did the 
United Kingdom in the early 1960s and Portugal just before the indepen-
dence of its African colonies. In both cases a metropolitan ancestry was 
imposed as a condition for repatriation. In those cases where the transfer 
of sovereignty was accompanied by mass migration, there was legislation 
aimed at defining future arrivals from these former territories as migrants 
tout court, without specific entitlement to citizenship. Only where post-
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In Western Europe, there is one more characteristic of postcolonial mi-
gration which merits attention. In France, there is a large measure of over-
lap between Muslim and postcolonial immigration, the major exception 
among the postcolonial migrants being a minority from the Caribbean, 
Indochina and the Jewish from Algeria, and the major exception among 
the Muslim immigrants being the Turks. In the United Kingdom, there is 
only a partial overlapping, as the majority of South Asian immigrants are 
Muslim but a substantial minority of South Asians are either Hindu or 
Sikh, and black Britons are predominantly Christian. In the Netherlands 
and Portugal, there is little overlap between the two categories. One may 
consider that this has assumed relevance as a political factor, as the crisis 
of Western European multiculturalism has become increasingly linked to 
misgivings about Islam. 
Colonial Subjects to Postcolonial Migrants:  
(Dis)continuities
‘Postcolonial’ is used in this book in a broader sense than simply a tem-
poral one (as in the description ‘after the end of the colonial empires’). 
It alludes to the ways the colonial past has left material and non-material 
legacies, ranging from metropolitan demographics and culture to ongoing 
ideological and possibly psychological impacts. The issue of colonial-to-
postcolonial continuities has been widely discussed in the academic sphere, 
but has increasingly attracted wider attention, for example in the recent 
fierce French political debates on the nature and impact of colonialism. 
In France, as in Portugal and Russia for that matter, there is a direct 
historical connection between decolonization and the breakdown of the 
metropolitan political system. Portugal rid itself of the Salazar regime and 
its former colonies in one stroke, and its new Socialist government made 
anti-colonialism a serious issue during its first ten years from 1974. It later 
on gave an amnesty to irregular immigrants from its former colonies, and 
more recently formulated a multicultural approach as a key issue in its 
governmental programme. In contrast to Portugal, France became less 
democratic as its Fifth Republic, born from the turmoil of the Algerian 
war, followed the path of an increase in presidential powers at the expense 
of the parliament. The violence of the struggle for decolonization reached 
Paris on 17 October 1961, when an FLN (the Algerian National Lib-
eration Front) demonstration was brutally oppressed and some hundred, 
mainly Algerian, demonstrators were killed.6 However, most other de-
In some cases, the argument of colonial linkages, and hence community 
rights and governmental responsibilities, helped to secure access from for-
mer colonies even if the immediate linkage had long been severed. In this 
regard, Margarida Marques details how this type of communitarian pres-
sure to secure greater leniency in immigration policies benefited tens of 
thousands of Africans and Brazilians in Portugal. Even though the rights 
of abode for non-repatriates were formally curtailed after the collapse of 
the Luso-African Empire, many were still accepted. Likewise, almost two 
decades after the independence of Brazil, it still proved relatively easy for 
Brazilians to settle in Portugal – their command of the Portuguese lan-
guage being a crucial postcolonial asset.
The belated Spanish experience of postcolonial immigration is another 
case in point. Most of the Spanish Empire had already collapsed by the 
early nineteenth century. Around 1900, Spain also lost Cuba, Puerto Rico 
and the Philippines, and was left with nothing but a few scattered settle-
ments in Africa. While the later remnants of a long colonial history left 
Spain with a delicate postcolonial relationship with the Western Sahara, 
this linkage was of little importance in comparison to the strong bonds 
still existing with the Spanish-speaking Americas. Over the centuries, mil-
lions of Spaniards had migrated there, mostly for economic reasons but 
at times, as after the civil war of 1936–1939, also through political mo-
tivation. Conversely, political refugees escaped from Spanish American 
dictatorships from the 1960s through to the early 1980s, followed by 
substantial labour migration from all over the continent. As an outcome 
of bilateral agreements rooted in the rhetoric of a common hispanidad, it is 
much easier for Spanish American nationals to obtain Spanish citizenship 
than it is for immigrants from other non-EU countries. Indeed, in 2008, 
of the 2.3 million residents of Spain who were born in Latin America, 
1.8 million did not hold Spanish citizenship.5 In other words, while de-
colonization was a thing of the remote past and while these immigrants 
therefore do not qualify as postcolonial migrants in the strict sense, their 
presence in Europe is a direct consequence of colonial history – produc-
ing millions of Spanish-speaking, Catholic potential migrants who were 
clearly preferred in Spain over other migrants from the South.
In most cases, postcolonial migrations have been characterized by a 
near-exclusive orientation on the former metropolis. A partial exception 
here involves postcolonial migrants from the former British Empire. Mi-
gration from the British West Indies in particular has been markedly bi-
furcated, leading simultaneously to the United Kingdom and the United 
States, both before, during and in the immediate aftermath of decoloniza-
tion. For the majority of cases however, this criterion of orientation on the 
former metropolis is relevant.
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some of them related to the illegal status of their residence in Europe. The 
later cohorts of postcolonial immigrants resemble in many respects the 
labour migrants of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, and their 
diachronic convergence towards the absorption and assimilation or inte-
gration of immigrants in all periods. Successful integration as measured 
by socioeconomic, educational and even political parameters, first and 
foremost needs time – roughly three generations. This more optimistic 
analysis also departs from a more flexible definition of the end result. ‘Full 
integration’ does not imply complete assimilation or acculturation to the 
receiving society’s cultural conventions, and may well include continuing 
political as well as cultural transnationalism.7 
Even if we accept the position of diachronic convergence, however, the 
collective pre-migration profiles of postcolonial migrants do matter to the 
integration process. There are a few hard and many more soft criteria and 
resultants, but there are three important ones which set postcolonial mi-
grants apart from other non-elite migrants from the Global South. The 
first is the prior possession of, or relative ease of access to, full metropolitan 
citizenship rights. The second criterion is cultural and linguistic affinity; 
and the third one is the way in which migrant biographies are linked to 
diasporic experiences and the specific character of transnational bonds with 
their countries of origin. In this respect a distinction needs to be made be-
tween subaltern and dominant groups within the colonies, the latter being 
the classical ‘colonials’, who were invariably metropolitan citizens. 
Exposure to metropolitan cultural influence differed considerably be-
tween and within the former colonies. Not all colonial regimes valued 
the transfer of metropolitan culture and language to the same degree. 
Even within one colonial empire there could be remarkable contrasts 
that would leave strong postcolonial legacies. For example in the former 
Dutch Caribbean, Suriname did eventually adopt Dutch over the local 
Creole Sranantongo as the national language, whereas in Curaçao the Cre-
ole Papiamentu retained its dominance over Dutch until today, seriously 
disadvantaging Antillean immigrants in the Netherlands. Throughout all 
colonial empires, exposure to and adoption of metropolitan culture and 
language were more prevalent in the higher echelons of society. In turn, 
the social hierarchy correlated almost by definition with levels of economic 
development and urbanization, and also with ‘race’, ethnicity and colour.
Exposure to metropolitan culture was thus unevenly distributed, but 
overall we may conclude that all postcolonial migrants had gone through 
a degree of pre-migration socialization which gave them a competitive 
edge over other, non-elite immigrants. This does not imply total cultural 
affinity. It should not be taken for granted that this exposure would result 
in enthusiastic adoption of all aspects of metropolitan culture. Nor, of 
colonizing nations managed to proceed with the process without letting it 
interfere as dramatically with domestic politics. 
From a (post)colonial migrant’s point of view, there may have been 
continuity between the experience of colonial traditions of labour recruit-
ment and segregation and the concomitant socio-racial, apartheid-like 
structures ‘back home’, and the European policies regarding entrance and 
settlement of ‘non-Western’ immigrants and new practices of (re)defin-
ing (postcolonial) citizenship. In the metropolis, postcolonial immigrants 
often experienced a chilly reception and racial discrimination, just as the 
lesser numbers of colonial migrants had witnessed in the pre-war decades. 
The continuities were tangible and painful – yet did not stop new mi-
grants from coming in.
It would be unwise therefore to underestimate the factor of metropoli-
tan racism as one dimension of the continuity from the colonial to the 
postcolonial period. ‘Race’, of course, did not have the same significance 
in all colonial and postcolonial settings. Neither did racism. In the post-
war period, overt racism did not disappear, but became unacceptable in 
official parlance, at least in the Western world. But other antagonisms 
surfaced. Since the 1990s, debates on immigration throughout Western 
Europe have tended to focus on the problems of Islam and the alleged 
refusal of Muslim immigrants to assimilate into metropolitan culture. As 
Shinder Thandi notes in his chapter on the United Kingdom, religion 
surpassed race as the mobilizing factor, which seems to follow the logic 
of oppositional identity politics on the part of the receiving society and 
the immigrants – on both sides, we may add. We might well ask what dif-
ference religion and race make in this respect, just as we should wonder 
about the colonial roots of contemporary stereotyping. It is not a fore-
gone conclusion that (post)colonial boundaries have become less relevant.
Both the persistence of old antagonisms and the emergence of rela-
tively new ones remind us of pessimistic claims that contemporary migra-
tions are far more problematic than the pre-war migrations to Europe 
and the United States. This position defines contemporary immigration 
as basically problematic, suggesting that not only racial, cultural and in 
particular religious differences, but also transnationalism, the demands of 
a post-industrial labour market and the concomitant educational demands 
all work together to increase social inequality. As most non-Western immi-
grants will suffer from this, they will find their integration thwarted; the 
result will be exclusion, partly self-sought, or the segmented assimilation 
of new immigrants at best. This pessimistic perspective is often taken to 
apply to most postcolonial immigrants as well.
The contributions to this book strongly suggest, however, that the inte-
gration problems of most postcolonial immigrants were class based, or for 
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there has been a constant exchange of non-material goods – cultural, re-
ligious and political ideas. The question is whether this sets postcolonial 
migrants apart from other migrants. The concept of diaspora in postcolo-
nial migrations has become topical since Hugh Tinker’s The Banyan Tree, 
and later on in the works of Steven Vertovec, Robin Cohen and others.10 
Transnationalism is nothing new, even though transnational networks 
have become increasingly dense as a result of modern means of transport 
and communication. There is some debate as to whether the concept ap-
plies in an imperial context, in which case transnationalism may be seen 
as an early constitutive force in building postcolonial identities. Perhaps 
the concept of diaspora has been stretched to its limits or beyond, but cer-
tainly for postcolonial migrants the concept of dispersion and the paradox 
of temporal, physical and mental distance, and at the same time cultural 
affinity, does apply – as in concepts such as the Black Atlantic, or in af-
finities with ‘Hindustan’ or more down-to-earth in the Bollywood craze. 
We may wonder in particular whether postcolonial migration has pro-
duced a specific kind of political transnationalism. Again, the evidence is 
inconclusive. There have been many instances of postcolonial immigrants 
in the metropolis struggling for political change in their country of ori-
gin, as with Algerians in France, Moluccans in the Netherlands and Latin 
American political exiles. The arguments deployed were invariably based 
upon the assertion that metropolitan government could not simply turn 
away from the legacies of empire. On the other hand, there is little indi-
cation that the governments of the countries of origin, former colonies, 
have been systematically involved in postcolonial migrants’ associations. 
This seems to contrast with the practices of the Turkish and Moroccan 
governments, as well as with Arab governments and agencies supporting 
the cause of Islam in Europe. We may tentatively state that the political 
transnationalism of the former colonies is less pronounced than that of the 
sending nations of labour migrants. 
The Core Countries of European Postcolonial Migration
Having delineated certain contours, we may now ask ourselves where spe-
cific European states fit in, and which other countries may provide addi-
tional comparative insight. We may begin with the Netherlands; perhaps 
the easiest case and one which indeed inspired us in the first place to think 
of postcolonial migrations as a category analytically separate from other 
migrant groups. There were basically three successive waves of substantial 
migrations to the metropolis. The first round, from 1945 through to the 
early 1960s, was directly connected to the process of the decolonization of 
course, should one expect a positive appreciation of the colonial period 
and its legacies. The metropolitan sojourn has often ended up producing 
precisely the opposite. Postcolonial identity politics centred not only on 
issues such as full civil rights, but equally on recognition of the question-
able morals of colonialism and its (presumed) contemporary legacies.
First of all, there are the traumas of colonialism, slavery, indenture and 
race discrimination that burden the relations between postcolonial mi-
grants and receiving societies. Moreover, in most cases there was the ex-
perience of a ‘chilly reception’ by metropolitan societies. Neither cultural 
affinity, shared citizenship nor, in the next generation, birth in the met-
ropolitan country guaranteed a warm welcome after decolonization. The 
marginal position of the harkis in France – the local soldiers who fought 
alongside the French in the Algerian War – is a case in point. In other cases 
the returnees were somehow made responsible for national humiliation 
and defeat, as Nicole Cohen argues in the case of the six million Japa-
nese hikiagesha (salvaged) who were repatriated from Korea, Manchuria 
and other Japanese colonial possessions after 1945. The reception given 
to Portuguese retornados and repatriated Dutch was less hostile, but was 
nonetheless often experienced as cold by the repatriates. It did not help 
that in the postcolonial metropolis, the burden of discredited colonialism 
was happily transferred to its repatriated local accomplices, now depicted 
as opportunistic exploiters coming to rely on their fatherland.
The history of postcolonial migration also suggests some sort of nexus 
between the colonial experience and the post-war adoption of multicul-
tural policies. Over time most governments in Europe and the Americas 
did acknowledge the importance of participation of citizens from differ-
ent national and cultural backgrounds to engage with one another about, 
in the favourable expression of Craig Calhoun, ‘the social arrangements 
which hold them together’.8 No doubt, the increasing receptivity towards 
diversity as part of a fundamental human rights discourse has been pivotal 
in creating space for the articulation of differences in Europe, as it has in 
the United States and Canada. But it seems that the adoption of models 
of multiculturalism by the Canadian and British governments – and per-
haps also in the Netherlands and Australia – was also grounded in colonial 
experiences of managing diversity.9 Of course this openness to some sort 
of multiculturalism, however moderate, did not arise spontaneously, but 
rather in response to the identity politics of postcolonial migrants. Either 
way, the connections between colonialism, postcolonial migration and the 
rise of multiculturalism in these countries seems evident. 
Postcolonial migrants have continued to engage in diasporic and trans-
national linkages, maintaining close contacts with and sending money to 
families or communities in their country of origin. At the same time, 
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past three decades has still been from former French colonies, primarily 
in Africa.12 
The British case has several similarities to the French one. The United 
Kingdom has a long tradition of immigration, only partially connected 
to its overseas empire. The links between the collapse of empire and mi-
gration are ambiguous. The post-war decolonization of British India in 
the late 1940s coincided with the beginnings of migration, but this only 
gained momentum long after. The same applies to other former British 
colonies in Asia and Africa. In contrast, migration from the British West 
Indies starting in the 1960s largely preceded the transfer of sovereignty. 
It is a moot point therefore how we should define ‘postcolonial migrants’ 
to the United Kingdom, and to what extent it remains useful to speak of 
postcolonial identity politics and metropolitan receptivity to claims link-
ing the colonial history to migrants’ concerns. But certainly in the work 
of British postcolonial scholars such as Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy, who 
have been of crucial relevance to the development of postcolonial studies, 
‘postcolonial’ is defined in very broad terms, going far beyond British 
imperial history and its aftermath.13 This difference between French and 
British postcolonial consciousness is not coincidental, but hinges on the 
fact that the United Kingdom has become part of a wider Western post-
colonial world shaped by its own former settler colonies and dominions – 
the United States, Canada and Australia. These three countries play quite 
an important role in the debates on postcolonialism and multiculturalism. 
We will return to this point at the end of our introduction. 
Other ‘Postcolonial’ States
There is a second group of former European colonial powers which prima 
facie have less to do with the issue of postcolonial migrants. The Spanish 
Empire had virtually collapsed by 1900, Germany ceded its short-lived 
African colonies at the end of the First World War, and Denmark sold its 
tiny Caribbean islands to America in 1917. Migration from these various 
former colonies was insignificant in all but the Spanish case, and bears no 
immediate relation to the process of decolonization. The picture becomes 
more complicated in the cases of the post-war decolonization of the Afri-
can possessions of Italy and Belgium. Italy was forced to leave its short-
lived East African colonies in 1941 and its possessions in the Balkans in 
1943/44, while Belgium consented to the transfer of sovereignty to the 
Congo in 1960. Italy received about 600,000 immigrants from North Af-
rica, but these came both from its own and the French colonial territories. 
Indonesia and involved selected groups linked to the demise of the colo-
nial regime. The second round, in the 1970s, involved the mass migration 
of a cross-section of the Surinamese population, preferring the metropolis 
over an independent republic. In the last and ongoing round that began 
in the 1980s, citizens of the still non-sovereign Dutch Caribbean islands 
have exercised their right of abode by settling in the metropolis, perma-
nently or temporarily. These postcolonial migrations had little overlap 
with two other categories, namely labour migrants recruited mainly in the 
southern Mediterranean region, followed by family reunion, and political 
and economic refugees from Asia and Africa.
Portugal presents a similar case. Just like the Netherlands and with 
more justification, Portugal thought of itself as an emigration country up 
to the 1960s. In addition to the ten million Portuguese living in Portu-
gal itself, there were another five million Portuguese living in diaspora, 
as Margarida Marques notes in her contribution. This changed after the 
rather sudden fall of its dictatorship and the subsequent transfer of sover-
eignty to Angola and Mozambique in the mid-1970s. Within a few years, 
Portugal had received 580,000 retornados, of whom 60 per cent had been 
born in Portugal.11 At least 100,000 of them left for another destination, 
and in this respect there is also a strong similarity to those repatriated 
from Indonesia, of whom one-sixth left for the United States, Australia 
and other destinations. Even if those repatriated were relatively privileged, 
they still had problems in adapting to metropolitan society. 
The cases of the other two countries experiencing mass migration from 
the former colonies are more complicated. France recruited foreign labour 
from the late nineteenth century until the 1970s, mainly from Italy and 
Poland. This policy was only reinforced by successive waves of (post)co-
lonial labour migrations. Though in the pre-war years hundreds of thou-
sands of labour migrants from French overseas territories were already 
working in France, the first mass migration dates from the early 1960s 
and involved one million pieds noirs (including 130,000 Algerian Jews 
who had received French citizenship in 1870), French settlers departing 
from Algeria after its bloody war for independence, and about 140,000 
harkis (colonial soldiers) and other ‘indigenous’ Algerians. In the same 
decade, the state started concerted programmes for labour recruitment 
in the non-sovereign French Caribbean departments, following earlier 
waves of labour migration from North Africa. Perhaps the immigration 
of substantial numbers of political refugees from former French Indochina 
also qualifies as ‘postcolonial’ in the sense we use it – albeit there was a 
time-lapse of some two decades between the departure of the French and 
the start of this migration. Much of the immigration into France over the 
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Asian parts of the former Soviet Union. Many of them had belonged to 
the elites of the non-Russian republics. In contrast, the millions of non-
Slavic migrants had provided labour in the realm of the former Soviet 
Union for half a century, but were subsequently no longer able to obtain 
work permits. Currently 3.5 million Azeris, Armenians and Georgians are 
living in the Russian Federation, mainly around Moscow. A substantial 
proportion, possibly a good majority, does not have a regular status. Their 
marginalized position in the former metropolis reminds us of the status 
of sub-Saharan Africans in Portugal and France – though it seems that 
Russian hostility towards these living remnants of empire is exceptional 
by any standards.
Similar examples of implosion of empire followed by migration (‘repa-
triation’) from the lost territories to the nuclear state are provided by the 
Ottoman and German empires. The implosion of the Ottoman Empire 
stretched over 150 years from the lost sea battle of Çesme in 1770 to 
the peace treaties of Sèvres in 1920 and Lausanne in 1923. Step by step 
it lost Southern Russia with the Crimea (1783), Egypt (1811), Serbia 
(1815), Greece (1829), Algeria (1830), Romania, Montenegro, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Cyprus (all 1878), Tunisia (1881), Crete (1900), Libya 
(1912), Albania (1913) and the rest of the Arabian provinces at the end 
of the First World War. Acts of ethnic cleansing were endemic throughout 
this process. As a consequence, refugees and those loyal to, or dependent 
on, the empire took refuge in the shrinking motherland which increasingly 
lost its multi-ethnic and multi-religious character.17 Ataturk reworked the 
demographic history of the implosion into the ideal of a purely Turk-
ish nation. In total, many millions of Turks (or, more precisely, Muslim 
immigrants, including some from the Caucasus) were involved in this 
‘repatriation’ – sometimes more than once in a lifetime – the last stage of 
which may have been the immigration of seven hundred thousand Turks 
from Bulgaria between 1940 and 1990. Most of these immigrants settled 
in urban north-western Anatolia. Today between a third and a quarter of 
the Republic’s population are descendants of these Muslim immigrants, 
known as Muhacir or Göçmen.18
The German Empire was not dismembered piecemeal but shrunk with 
two enormous blows: after the First World War it had to cede – apart 
from its overseas colonies – major border regions with Poland, Denmark 
and France; and after the Second World War, apart from its conquests 
since 1939, more border regions with Poland. Both events triggered 
massive streams of refugees to Germany. Other immigrants of German 
stock joined in. Their grandparents and other forefathers had settled in 
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe in the preceding centuries, as a rule 
Belgium received some 120,000 immigrants from the Congo after 1960, 
the great majority of these being Belgian repatriates.
Germany and Denmark did not experience any significant immigration 
from their former overseas colonies, and while postcolonial migrations 
from Africa to Spain, Belgium, and Italy were of some consequence, they 
have not attracted much scholarly attention. It is debatable whether, in 
these five countries, colonial reminiscences play a role in attitudes towards 
migration at large.14 
This second group of European countries presents the possibility of 
an alternative take on the way metropolitan states deal with their colo-
nial past. The question becomes how and when these states, in the vir-
tual absence of postcolonial immigrations (Denmark, Germany) or with 
much smaller numbers (Spain, Belgium, Italy) and hence less exposed to 
postcolonial identity politics, have reflected upon their colonial history, 
if at all. Answering this question, we suppose, may also help us to better 
understand the British, French, Dutch and Portuguese ‘memory wars’ – 
including the counterfactual question: how would colonialism resonate 
had there not been massive postcolonial migrations? An obvious case in 
point is the way Atlantic slavery is actively commemorated in the three 
European countries with a sizable Caribbean population, namely France, 
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, but is all but ignored in Portu-
gal, Spain and Denmark.15 
In a discussion of migrations linked to the decolonization histories of 
European powers, Russia seems an odd case, both because the country is 
not always thought of as truly European and because of the conventional 
but never tested idea about European colonialism implying expansionism 
crossing salt water. Yet the Russian case certainly provides intriguing in-
sights. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union – a decolonization of sorts – 
about twenty-five million ethnic Russians found themselves politically and 
culturally displaced. At least three million ethnic Russians living in one or 
other of the former Soviet Republics either chose to return to Russia, or 
were forced to do so. The rights of these ‘expatriate’ Russians are still part 
of Russian power geopolitics.16
However, there is an additional field for comparison, which is spelled 
out by Blakeley in his pioneering contribution. This may not yet cover as 
much ground as most of the other chapters, but provides us with some 
remarkable new comparative insights. Just like countries such as Portugal 
and France, which have their retornados or pieds noirs on the one hand and 
the (North) African (labour) immigrants on the other, there is a clear 
demarcation line in Russian postcolonial migration between Slavic and 
non-Slavic migrants. The Slavic postcolonial migrants to the Russian 
Federation came overwhelmingly from the (poorer) Asian and Central 
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Multiculturalism and Identity Politics
From the above we can only conclude that that there is not an unam-
biguous historical connection between postcolonial migration, degrees of 
multiculturalism, and hence openness to identity politics. The different 
histories of the receiving states, as well as the heterogeneity of the various 
groups of postcolonial migrants, do not enable us to identify such a con-
nection easily. 
With this caveat in mind, we may now turn to the question of whether 
preceding colonial histories determined or at least strongly influenced 
the formulation of integration policies by postcolonial states. How did 
these prior experiences impinge upon their receptivity or their rejection of 
‘identity politics’ and the development of multiculturalism? In general, we 
suggest that postcolonial states with pre-colonial native minorities plus 
long histories of European immigration – for example the United States 
and Canada, but also Australia and possibly New Zealand – are among 
the most committed to multiculturalism. On the other end of the con-
tinuum, there are a number of states with a long and often violent history 
of linguistic, cultural, religious and ethnic diversity – Russia and Turkey, 
but also Austria, heir of a former double monarchy – where the concept of 
multiculturalism (consequently) has made hardly any impact at all.
In Europe, the United Kingdom pioneered multicultural policies, in a 
context in which vociferous community leaders and intellectuals of post-
colonial backgrounds had acquired substantial political influence. A de-
cade or so later, the Netherlands came to adopt a more moderate model 
of multiculturalism, again stimulated by postcolonial demands. France 
hesitated between the anti-communitarian republican traditions and the 
immigrant demands, which in the French case almost equated to the de-
mands of postcolonial migrants. Over the past two decades, more room 
has been allowed for diversité, but even so, support for multiculturalism 
has remained relatively low – the more so as republican ideals are associ-
ated with laïcité whereas multiculturalism is often associated with extreme 
communitarian demands, particularly those made by radical Islamists.
Meanwhile, over recent decades, Belgium, Germany and Portugal have 
all taken some steps in the direction of multiculturalism – some steps for-
ward, some backwards, as has been the case all over Western Europe, but 
with the years post-2000 clearly featuring a return to more nationalist 
approaches to identity issues. Portugal is a remarkable case, a nation that 
like its giant heir Brazil has acknowledged its mixed diasporic character. At 
the same time, the ideology of Lusophony has less to offer to its subaltern 
postcolonial immigrants from Africa and equally has trouble in accepting 
at the invitation of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires, not in 
the least to populate territories newly conquered from the Turks. After 
the First World War about one million refugees were registered, 850,000 
from the territories ceded to Poland, 150,000 from Alsace-Lorraine, and 
a mere 16,000 from the tropical colonies.19 After the Second World War 
the numbers were even more impressive. In 1950 the Federal Republic 
of Germany in the West counted 7.9 million refugees and the German 
Democratic Republic 1.4 million. But this was not all: whereas in 1950, 
16.5 per cent of the West German population consisted of refugees, five 
years later this proportion was 17.5 percent.20 These groups were strongly 
organized and constituted an important part of the electorate. Because 
of a clause in the German Constitution closely related to the emerging 
Cold War, any person who could claim German descent was entitled to 
enter the Federal Republic.21 This resulted in the immigration of 1.36 
million Aussiedler between 1950 and 1987 and another 3 million between 
1988 and 2004, of which the vast majority were from the Soviet Union. 
The total number of ‘German’ immigrants after the Second World War 
amounted to some 14 million.22
For comparative purposes, it is useful once more to look beyond Europe. 
With regard to openness to multiculturalism, the United States and Japan 
are on two extremes of the scale. The American academia has played a dom-
inant role in debates on multiculturalism and postcolonialism worldwide. 
The relative American openness may partly be explained by the fact that, 
in contrast to European countries, the United States has thought of itself 
as the quintessential immigrants’ nation, as well as by its growing unease 
with its own record of dealing with the now small Native American popula-
tion, and the considerable African-American population. The United States 
moreover has attracted massive immigration from Latin America, a conti-
nent with a long experience of informal American imperialism. 
The aftermath of Japan’s colonization of parts of continental East Asia, 
and particularly the post-war repatriation of millions of Japanese, presents 
an altogether different story. There has been little debate on colonialism 
within Japan, and it has completely discarded the multicultural rhetoric 
that was part of its pan-Asian expansionist history. The postcolonial mi-
grants or hikiagesha may well present their multicultural past as a positive 
extra dimension against a homogeneous Japanese culture – the parallels 
with the ways in which the pieds noirs in France and the Indische Neder-
landers in the Netherlands present their colonial pasts as multicultural are 
clear. But as Nicole Cohen remarks, there is precious little mainstream ap-
preciation in Japan of postcolonial identity politics, and the postcolonial 
immigrant population seems to have virtually no political power. 
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adopt, if not downright reject, multiculturalism. Perhaps this reflects the 
fact that the early generation of postcolonial migrants (pieds noirs, Volks-
deutsche and Indische Netherlanders) all chose a path of assimilation and in-
deed ended up being smoothly integrated, thus setting a normative model 
which other migrants were not able or perhaps willing to emulate.
Table I.3. Comparing the ranking of countries in terms of non-postcolonial (‘other’) 
immigration in general with their susceptibility to multiculturalism
Multiculturalism >
Other Immigration \/











From this perspective it seems only natural that high post-imperial im-
migration in Japan did not produce any inclination towards inclusionary 
politics and national self-criticism, simply because of the absence of any 
other types of immigration. In contrast to that, it is striking that three 
of the four European countries in the moderate to high postcolonial im-
migration category – France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
– have recently acknowledged the significance of colonialism in their na-
tional histories, increasingly allowing for a fair degree of self-criticism. 
The reason why Portugal has lagged behind in this respect may be that its 
share of postcolonial migration consisted mainly of repatriates, usually a 
more conservative community – as were the pieds noirs and Indische Ned-
erlanders. Germany, finally, was mainly welcoming lost compatriots whose 
reintegration could well be accomplished without broadening definitions 
of the German nation. And here, we find striking similarities with the 
imploding former Ottoman and Russian empires. 
As we proceed into the twenty-first century, we may well wonder about 
the continuing relevance of categorizations exploring the links between 
types of migrants and openness to multiculturalism. Throughout conti-
nental Europe, but also in the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada, we 
observe a tendency towards narrowing definitions of the nation and hence 
away from a high level of multiculturalism. At the same time, there is 
broad agreement that immigrant communities have come to stay and that 
their integration is a top priority. There are heated debates, sometimes 
attacks on ‘foreigners’ and particularly Muslims, but there is no silenc-
ing of dissident voices, and a broad acceptance of postcolonial voices. In 
that along the way the Portuguese language and culture have been thor-
oughly creolized, with Brazil rather than Portugal now leading the way. 
Multiculturalism therefore has become a politically contested, progressive 
alternative to the imperial ideology of Lusophony.
It is necessary to disentangle an evident nexus linking a colonial past 
and the degree of postcolonial immigration to multiculturalism and hence 
receptivity to the claims of minorities, in this case postcolonial identity 
politics. It may help if we broaden our definition from ‘postcolonial’ to 
‘post-imperial’, which makes it easier to incorporate the post-war experi-
ences of Germany and Russia. There seems to be a remarkable inverse 
relation between the importance of post-empire immigration and the po-
litical choice in favour of or against multiculturalism, as Table I.2 below 
illustrates. In fact, the higher the demographic impact of post-empire mi-
gration, the lower the adherence to multiculturalism. Demography is of 
course not the only factor impinging upon the ideology and practice of 
multiculturalism. Multiculturalism works strongly in the U.K. and its for-
mer settled colonies, and has captured more progressive political forces in 
continental Europe in particular. In South European countries it is clearly 
a countervailing force against the dominant concepts of national identity.





Low Moderate–Low Moderate–High High
High [4.9 +] Germany Japan
Turkey
Portugal
Medium [3.6–4.2] Russia France Netherlands U.K.
Low [0.4–1.8] Italy Belgium
Spain
Denmark U.S.A.  
Australia Canada
*Percentages from Table I.1
Further, if we compare with recent total immigration, we do not find a 
positive correlation. France and the U.K. are equally important as im-
migration countries, but have very different positions regarding multicul-
turalism. Both Germany and the typical English-speaking former settler 
colonies (United States, Canada and Australia) are countries with high 
levels of overall immigration, but clearly Germany is not very susceptible 
to multiculturalism in contrast to white settler colonies (See Table I.3). 
One striking commonality, however, in the group of European countries 
housing substantial numbers of both postcolonial and other migrants 
(France, Germany and the Netherlands) seems to be their hesitance to 
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this respect too, the undigested history of colonialism and post-imperial 
migration to Japan and Russia produces an altogether different, more un-
comfortable postcolonial condition. 
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